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Abstract 
Scholars have extensively detailed China’s conflation of the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang with the international war on 
terror following September 11, 2001. Less studied is how the U.S. responded to China’s framing of the Uyghur as 
terrorists, and of the Chinese government’s characterization of Xinjiang as a region fraught with violence and 
extremism. On the whole, scholars who have addressed this latter issue conclude that China successfully coopted the 
U.S., and consequently cracked down on Xinjiang without substantial international outrage. On the basis of a review 
of official U.S. documents before and after 9/11, I argue that the U.S. response to China’s framing of the Uyghur is 
not as clear-cut, and that multiple and conflicting U.S. responses emerged to the Uyghur-terrorist discourse. 
Specifically, the U.S. shifted from purely framing the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses to projecting three 
new frames onto the Uyghur: victims of the war on terror; a minority group that may resort to violent methods of 
protest; and suspected terrorists. This new interpretation holds important ramifications for how scholars should 
understand China’s treatment of the Uyghur, as well as for Sino-U.S. relations.  
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Introduction  
On July 5th, 2009, a riot1 in China directed the attention of the international community towards 
a previously obscure area and people group: the Uyghur.2 The riot, which was originally a 
peaceful protest, took place in Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and left more than 1,700 injured 
and 197 dead, involving thousands of rioters—most of whom were ethnic Uyghur—in a country 
notorious for harsh repression and no civil right to protest.3 Indeed, such a public demonstration 
of similar size had not been seen in Communist China since protesters advocated for democracy 
at Tiananmen in 1989. 
                                                
1 Though the 2009 Ürümqi incident began as a peaceful protest, this event is referred to here as a riot because the 
demonstration escalated into a violent conflict between the Han, Uyghur, and Chinese police. Also, in major news 
sources like Xinhua and The New York Times, this event is referred to as a riot. Edward Wong, “Riots in Western 
China Amid Ethnic Tension,” New York Times, July 5, 2009, accessed December 12, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html. 
2 Although this ethnic group is referred to as both the Uyghur and the Uighur, this paper uses the prior spelling 
because major Uyghur organizations like the Uyghur American Association and World Uyghur Congress refer to 
themselves as the Uyghur.  
3 Yufan Hao and Weihua Liu. “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain in the Heart of China’s Borderland.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 21.74 (2012): 205, accessed October 5, 2015, doi:10.1080/10670564.2012.635927. 
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Despite a series of incidents in Xinjiang stemming from years of repressive policies and 
growing Uyghur ethnic identity, it was not until the 2009 Ürümqi riots that the Uyghur became 
the public locus of China’s ethnic tension. Like the Tiananmen protests, the struggle in Xinjiang 
brought to light domestic turmoil in China. Also, this incident similarly sparked calls for more 
democracy and human rights in China as well as accusations of government cruelty reminiscent 
of Tiananmen. However, while the Tiananmen protests called for political reform and 
modernization modeled on the democratic West, the Ürümqi riots primarily revolved around  
frustration over discrimination, ethnic tension, and lack of religious freedom. Furthermore, 
Tiananmen involved students and workers, and took place during China’s economic emergence  
in Beijing—one of China’s most modern cities; whereas the Ürümqi riots involved the Uyghur—
a politically underrepresented and economically disadvantaged ethnic group—in the relatively 
undeveloped region of Xinjiang. Another key distinction that can be drawn between Tiananmen 
and Ürümqi is how the protesters and rioters were framed: in Tiananmen, those involved were 
called supporters of “bourgeois liberalism.”4 In Ürümqi, the Uyghur were framed as “separatists” 
“extremists,” and even suspected as “terrorists.”5 This choice to connect unrest in Xinjiang with 
terrorism is largely due to geopolitical factors: Xinjiang has been an indispensable geopolitical 
and economic asset to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its integration into mainland 
China, but it now represents a serious domestic and international challenge. Yufan Hao and 
Weihua Liu expressed this well when they wrote that the “Xinjiang issue involves China’s core 
                                                
4 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Tiananmen Square Incident,” accessed December 2, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident.  
5 Thomas Cliff, “The Partnership of Stability in Xinjiang: State-Society Interactions Following the July 2009 
Unrest,” China Journal 68 (2012): 80, accessed December 2, 2015, ISSN: 1234-9347. 
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interests and the most serious challenge Beijing faces is how to cope with ethnic tension in a 
highly sensitive region bordered by politically unstable countries like Afghanistan.”6  
The significance of Xinjiang has led many scholars to analyze the various underlying 
causes of the ethnic tension behind the Urumqi riots, and to examine how the Chinese 
government has sought to manage this tension through education, social programs, and economic 
incentives. Since 9/11, scholars have focused attention on whether and how the U.S. sponsored 
“war on terror” has influenced China to associate the Uyghur Muslim population with global 
terrorism. Many scholars, specialists, and officials in the U.S. argue that China’s “cooperation” 
in the war on terror has functioned as a thinly-veiled excuse to pursue political ends unrelated to 
halting terrorism. This body of scholarship has led to special attention directed at the Uyghur in 
Xinjiang, and the tracing of China’s quick inclination to blame violence in Xinjiang on Muslim 
Uyghur terrorists back to 9/11.  Read in this light, the Uyghur uprising is the beginning of 
China’s effort to portray cracking down on Xinjiang as simply part of the global war on terror. 
For these scholars, it is not surprising that in the immediate aftermath of the Ürümqi riots, 
China’s major newspaper Xinhua speculated that terrorism was involved and placed the Uyghur 
at the top of the list of terror suspects:  
“As the casualties rise from the July 5 riot in Ürümqi . . . experts have warned that terrorism might be the 
real driving force behind the violence. Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna said in a telephone interview 
with Xinhua on Friday that the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which China alleges instigated the riot, is 
closely associated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist group that has been 
labeled by the U.N. Security Council as well as the Chinese and U.S. governments a terrorist 
organization.”7  
 
Scholars have extensively examined how official Chinese statements like this one 
demonstrate the government’s intent to co-opt the U.S. war on terror for its own political ends. 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Yan Hao, Ruibin Geng and Yuan Ye, “Xinjiang Riot Hits Regional Anti-terror Nerve,” Xinhua, June 18, 2009. 
Accessed September 28, 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/18/content_11727782.htm.  
6 
Jai       
This paper goes further by analyzing how this leveraging also impacts the U.S. discourse 
surrounding the Uyghur. In order to thoroughly explore and explain this issue, this paper does 
the following: examine the various ways the scholarly community explains the CCP’s treatment 
of the Uyghur issue in Xinjiang; discuss China’s leveraging of the war on terror to justify its 
crackdown on Xinjiang; and evaluate official U.S. statements and the developing public 
discourse they represent. Ultimately, this research leads to a new interpretation of how 9/11 
changed the situation for the Uyghur, even thousands of miles away in the U.S. Though prior to 
9/11, in U.S. official documents, the Uyghur were either unacknowledged or framed as victims 
of human rights abuses, following the advent of the international war on terror and the anti-
Muslim discourse it created, the Uyghur’s identity in U.S. politics became more prominent and 
necessarily multifaceted: the Uyghur became no longer just human rights victims, but also 
victims of the war on terror, and contradictorily, possible terrorists themselves. Overall, this new 
framing reveals that in response to China’s portrayal of Xinjiang as the locus of its war on terror, 
U.S. framing of the Uyghur is no longer binary, but diverse and complex.  
 
Xinjiang: a catch-22 situation 进退维谷的情况 
To fully understand the situation in Xinjiang, it is important to first grasp the history and 
significance of this region: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous, abbreviated to XUAR and 
written as 新疆自治区 in Chinese, is located in China’s extreme northwest, and is the country’s 
largest province. Although most people view China as ethnically and culturally homogenous, 
Xinjiang is multi-ethnic, with the Uyghur, or 维吾尔族, constituting only a slim majority of the 
population (9.832 million in Xinjiang) over the Han (8.363 million), who make up the 
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overwhelming majority of China’s population at 91 percent.8 This region has a tumultuous 
history, and conflict between groups vying for power in Xinjiang is not a recent development. 
Indeed, Xinjiang experienced multiple periods of domination by local warlords in the intervals 
between the collapse of one Chinese dynasty, and the consolidation of power in the next. This 
fluctuation between eras of external rule by Chinese empires and internal domination by 
warlords ended in 1949 with the entrance of the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang.  
However the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was not formally established until 1955.9   
 China’s history of losing and regaining its foothold in Xinjiang is connected with the 
region’s politically valuable geographical location. As Figure 1 shows, China borders eight  
separate countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrghizstan, Tajikistan, Russia, the Republic of Mongolia, 
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
                                                
8 Linda T.H. Tsung and Ken Cruickshank, “Mother Tongue and Bilingual Minority Education in Xinjiang.” 
International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism 12.5 (2009): 551, accessed September 28, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/13670050802153434.  
9Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 206-207.  
Figure 1: Wannabe Polyglot, “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” accessed November 13, 2015, 
https://ibbeijinger.wordpress.com/2013/05/23/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region/.  
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Geopolitically, Xinjiang is of vital importance to China, which is completely landlocked along 
its western borders. Furthermore, Xinjiang serves as a buffer between conflict in the Middle East 
and Mainland China, although this tension historically spills over into Xinjiang, especially from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, Xinjiang is considered virtually a cultural-political fault 
line and an area of instability and confrontation between the Middle East and Asia.   
 Besides its geopolitical significance, Xinjiang holds economic significance for China. As 
one-sixth of China’s landmass, the region houses immense natural resources and potential for 
economic development. In addition to being the passageway of the new Eurasian continental 
bridge, Xinjiang is the most important energy base in China, and contains 115 of the 147 raw 
materials found in the entire country.10 Furthermore, if Xinjiang were to become independent, 
Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and other regions with strong ethnic identities, could quite possibly 
follow, and China would lose more than half it’s territory and critical resources—a blow which 
would severely set the Chinese economy on a downward course.  Nevertheless, the chance of 
losing Xinjiang always existed, as ethnic tension, primarily between the Uyghur and Han 
peoples, threatens to destabilize the region. This increasing tension is largely due to the 
increasing Han population in Xinjiang province—a purposeful policy decision on the part of the 
CCP to dilute the Uyghur population and thereby diffuse ethnic conflict.11  However, contrary to 
expectations, this strategy of ethnic dilution has had the opposite effect, as it is reported 
“attitudes of racial and cultural superiority have become commonplace as the Han population in 
Xinjiang grows.”12   
                                                
10 Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 211.  
11Barry Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions: Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their Consequences for 
China,” Modern China 38.1(2012): 11, accessed November 14, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0097700411424563. 
12 Zang Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning Differentials in Urumchi.” The China Journal 65 (2011): 144, accessed 
October 10, 2015, doi:10.2307/25790561. 
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 Historically, the Han and Uyghur have a long history of ethnic tension which persists 
today. Much of this tension comes from discrimination against the Uyghur’s culture and beliefs, 
which distances this religious minority more than others from the generally nonreligious Han 
majority. Culturally, the Uyghur are viewed as barbaric and inferior, and therefore face bias in 
society as a whole, especially in the workplace.13 On the other hand, many Han people believe 
that the Uyghur receive unjust preferential treatment due to the government’s affirmative action 
policies—driving another wedge between these two groups.14 Moreover, the Uyghur feel 
removed from both political and economic development in Xinjiang due to a lack of political 
participation and economic involvement.15 Driven by a sense of unjust deprivation combined 
with a weak affiliation to local elite, many Uyghur have developed a strong tendency toward 
separatist nationalism, and therefore do not identify with China as a whole. Since the most 
important goal of the CCP is to “maintain stability,” or 保持稳定, there is little if any distinction 
drawn between separatism and terrorism in China’s policies toward the Uyghur.16  
 Lack of Uyghur integration into Chinese society has also led to the creation of multiple 
international Uyghur advocacy groups, the most prominent of which are the World Uyghur 
Congress (WUC), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the Uyghur American 
Association (UAA). While these organizations are widely regarded as peaceful human rights 
groups outside of China, several more controversial groups also exist, including the East 
Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).17 
                                                
13 Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 218. 
14 Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions,” 17.  
15 Ibid., 214. 
16 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Asian Affairs: An American 
Review 35.1 (2008): 16-17, accessed October 15, 2015, doi: 10.3200/AAFS.35.1.15-30. 
17 Ibid., 208.  
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The war on terror had significant consequences for these groups: since 9/11, China has insisted 
that all are dangerous, and that some are even terrorist organizations. 
 However, leveraging the war on terror in its Uyghur framing accounts for only one 
method employed by China to control and crackdown on this problematic region without 
invoking international involvement or even excessive criticism. Scholars on the Uyghur issue 
have extensively detailed how China attempts to deal with ethnic tension and separatism in the 
region since there is perhaps no issue about which China is more sensitive than its control of 
Xinjiang.18  
 
Discrimination, religion, and politics 
As previously discussed, the CCP’s political legitimacy rests on its ability to maintain stability 
nationwide—an ability that is threatened by ethnic tension in Xinjiang. Scholars identify several 
ways in which China has sought to address this ethnic tension: through anti-discrimination laws, 
preferential treatment policies, and decreasing the size of the Uyghur population through 
dilution. In the scholarly community, it is widely accepted that the Uyghur in Xinjiang face 
rampant discrimination in politics, the marketplace, and everyday life.19 This discrimination 
greatly contributes to ethnic tension between the Han and Uyghur, so the Chinese government 
enacted anti-discrimination laws in Xinjiang in hopes of decreasing the economic and social 
divide between these two groups.20 However, these laws are not effective, as they lack sincere 
enforcement.21 Another way that the government attempts to increase stability and decrease the 
                                                
18 Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 141. 
19 Ibid., 143.  
20 Ronald Brown, Understanding Labor and Employment Law in China, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 83-86.  
21 Sautman,“Paved with Good Intentions,” 15-16.  
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Han-Uyghur divide in the region is through preferential treatment policies. Still, some scholars 
argue that Uyghur favoritism actually exacerbates ethnic tension, because many Han Chinese see 
Uyghur as undeserving of special treatment, and accuse the government of reverse 
discrimination.22 Indeed, scholars Ma Rong, Wang Lixiong, and Wang Yinggou argue that the 
government should depoliticize ethnicity, because race-based policies potentially create barriers 
to integration.23 China scholar Thomas Cliff notes: Chinese policy-makers assume there is a 
“positive correlation between a high Han population and socio–political stability in Xinjiang.”24 
Indeed, other methods employed by the Chinese government include diluting the Uyghur 
ethnicity through a controversial policy of cash incentives for interracial marriage between the 
Uyghur and Han, and flooding the region with Han Chinese residents.25 Nevertheless, the 
outnumbering of the Uyghur has in many ways strengthened the identity of this ethnic group, 
which, in the face of “the Han other,” has grown more distinct and tightly-knit. Therefore, while 
there is now a higher population of Han Chinese now in Xinjiang, the 2009 Ürümqi riots show 
that ethnic tension still exists in Xinjiang, and China’s efforts to increase stability in the region 
have been largely ineffective.   
 Uyghur ethnic identity is also made more distinct because the differing religious 
traditions of these two groups fuel tension and complicate Uyghur integration into Han China. 
Religious and cultural tension is exacerbated by the fact that the Uyghur, who are primarily 
Sunni Muslims, live in a society that officially guarantees “freedom of religious belief” in its 
constitution, but often discourages any belief system that can threaten the CCP’s monopoly on 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23Ibid.  
24 Cliff, "The Partnership,” 83.  
25 Edward Wong, “To Temper Unrest in Western China, Officials Offer Money for Intermarriage,” New York Times, 
September 2, 2014, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/asia/to-temper-unrest-
china-pushes-interethnic-marriage-between-han-and-minorities.html. 
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power.26 The CCP’s seemingly insincere “religious freedom” policy not only confuses and 
frustrates the Uyghur, but also acts as a barrier to political participation. For example, in 1991 
the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee issued “The Notice on Proper 
Settlement of the Issue of Party Members’ Religious Belief.”27  This policy disallowed members 
of the Party from self-identifying as belonging to a particular religious sect, or participating in 
any religious activities. However, since religion is at the heart of Uyghur ethnic identity, the 
political opportunities of the Uyghur are limited by their core identity as a race founded upon a 
religion. Therefore, since they are unable to exercise much influence in local government, the 
Uyghur do not feel a part of the society which is dominated by largely secular Han politics.   
 
Poverty is the root of terrorism    
Scholars have also examined how China uses economic development policies to solidify its 
control over Xinjiang and to diffuse ethnic tension. These scholars cite Uyghur-Han earning 
differentials as a main cause of intergroup tensions and conflicts in Xinjiang, as well as a sense 
of relative deprivation on the part of the Uyghur. Yufan Hao and Wenhua Liu argue that earning 
differentials between the Uyghur and Han show that economic inequality is vast. Indeed many 
Uyghur feel they are economically disadvantaged.28 For example, there is an extremely high 
proportion of Uyghur farmers, and a low proportion of professional technical workers with 
relatively higher salaries—a disparity that is increasingly obvious to the Uyghur because of 
urbanization, the Internet, and television.29 The CCP approached this issue through the Invest in 
                                                
26 Council on Foreign Relations, “Religion in China,” accessed December 1, 2015, 
http://www.cfr.org/china/religion-china/p16272. 
27 Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 144.  
28 Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 214.  
29 Zang, Xiaowei, “Uyghur-Han Earning,” 143. 
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the West or Open-Up the West Project, known in Chinese as 西部大开发, a policy that aims to 
more evenly distribute China’s wealth and resources, which are primarily concentrated in the 
East.30 Xinjiang is a major recipient of these policy funds.  In fact, only a few years ago Premier 
of the PRC Li Keqiang announced that “the region's development and stability are at a critical 
moment” so Beijing would “invest another 7.26 billion yuan ($1.13 billion) in municipal 
infrastructure construction and other livelihood programs in Hotan in south Xinjiang.”31 
However, the Han have been the main beneficiaries of this economic growth in Xinjiang due to 
discriminatory hiring practices, and what scholar Jessica Koch terms “non-engaging economic 
development.” Basically, Koch argues that the main reason why economic growth cannot solve 
the Uyghur issue is that this development is “imposed” rather than “negotiated.”32 Indeed, Hao 
and Liu agree that although the “living standard for most Uyghurs has been improved, some still 
do not think they have benefited from the Reform and Open-up Policy or West Development 
Campaign, which they feel is just aimed at transferring the oil and gas from the Uyghur region to 
the Han region.”33 Therefore, campaigns for economic development in Xinjiang have had the 
adverse effect of worsening ethnic tension through a combination of social discrimination, 
economic inequality, and a sense of relative deprivation and even exploitation. 
 
Closing the gap through education 
Another prevalent area of scholarship has examined how the Chinese government uses education 
directives to gain a firmer hold on Xinjiang. For example, one education campaign seeks to 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Yuan, Yuan, “More Help, More Prosperity,” Beijing Review 32 (2011): 1, accessed October 15, 2015, 
http://www.bjreview.com/Cover_Stories_Series_2011/2011-08/08/content_382091.htm. 
32 Jessica Koch, “Economic Development and Ethnic Separatism in Western China: A New Model of Peripheral 
Nationalism,” (PhD diss., Asia Research Center at the University of Amsterdam, 2006): 6.   
33 Hao and Liu, “Xinjiang: Increasing Pain,” 217.  
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promote the Mandarin dialect of Chinese, or 普通话, as a way to close the gap between the Han 
and Uyghur in the tense region. The reasoning behind this particular policy is that the Uyghur’s 
weaker command of Mandarin (their native tongue is a Turkic language known by the Han as 维
族话) is a driving force behind their inability to fully integrate into Han society, and also a 
practical reason why they are less successful in the workplace. Indeed, Eric Schluessel argues 
that “Uyghur identity, as understood and articulated by the secular elite, is fundamentally 
linguistic,”34 and Chien-peng Chung argues that “Many Uyghurs do not speak Mandarin 
Chinese, which is usually a prerequisite for good paying jobs or government positions.”35 
Consequently, the government established Mandarin-focused “bilingual” schools throughout 
Xinjiang. In theory they seek to promote Uyghur childrens’ “bilingual” education, but in 
practice, they force Mandarin over and above any other language, which further marginalizes the 
Uyghur.36  
 Moreover, this plan to “raise the cultural quality of Xinjiang people” through education is 
largely unworkable, as its implementation depends on educational resources that are simply not 
available, such as a sufficient number of qualified instructors.37 As a result, scholars note that 
this language imposition actually fuels bitterness among the Uyghur, who are “resentful about 
                                                
34 Eric T. Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-tongue Education in Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey 28.4 
(2009): 384, accessed September 25, 2015, doi: 10.1080/02634930903577144. 
35 Chung Chien-peng, “China's 'War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur Separatism,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, July/August, 2002, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-war-terror-september-11-
uighur-separatism/p4765. 
36 Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue,” 394.  
37 Ibid., 395-396.  
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the marginalization of the Uyghur language and interpret the language policy as just another ploy 
by the Chinese government to encroach on their cultural identity and dilute their heritage.”38 
 
The war on terror and diversionary strategy  
More recently, scholars have moved on from examination of these ineffective methods employed 
by the Chinese government to evaluation of how China leveraged the international hysteria 
surrounding the 9/11 attacks in 2001 to consolidate power in Xinjiang. A major theme 
dominating this scholarship is the diversionary theory of war put forth by Jaroslav Tir and 
Michael Jasinski, and applied to China by more recent scholars. The diversionary theory of war 
asserts that when confronted with public antagonism over domestic issues, government leaders 
sometimes divert the populaces’ attention from these problems, and thereby, survive 
politically.39 This method is extremely attractive to China, which, as a totalitarian regime without 
free elections, greatly fears public discontent and uncontrolled nationalism. This is because these 
outpourings of public feeling have historically threatened the regime’s monopoly on power and 
control.40 For example, one of China’s most significant challenges right now is controlling anti-
foreign nationalism (primarily against Japan and the U.S.), which, thanks to the creation of 
online communities, is a rallying point for grassroots nationalists.41 A nationalism that unites the 
majority against the Uyghur minority displaces this uncontrolled, anti-foreign nationalism, and is 
damaging for China’s foreign relations, transferring public outrage from an external “other” to 
                                                
38Rosalyn Ching Mun Lim, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic Marginalization as Drivers of Conflict in Xinjiang,” 
(PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2011): 77.  
39 Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic Minorities,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52.5 (2008): 641, accessed November 5, 2015, doi: 10.1177/0022002708318565. 
40 John Knight, “Economic Causes and Cures of Social Instability in China,” China & World Economy 22.2 (2014), 
accessed December 12, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2014.12059.x. 
41 Shunji Cui, “Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China’s Relations with Japan,” Journal of 
Historical Sociology 25.2 (2012): 203-210, accessed December 15, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2011.01419.x. 
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an “internal one that is much easier for the Chinese government to monitor and control.”42 
Consistent with Tir and Jasinski’s focus on the connection between nationalism and the use of 
diversionary force, J. Snyder likewise argues that in China, controlled nationalism is employed to 
divert the attention of the public away from problematic domestic issues. Furthermore, Kilic 
Bugra Kanat uses Tir and Jasinski’s diversionary theory to argue that the war on terror presented 
the perfect opportunity for China to divert public attention from recurring domestic troubles 
towards a “suspect community,” and to create a new, controlled anti-Uyghur nationalism.43  
 Besides augmenting political stability in China, the war on terror also allowed China to 
garner international legitimacy. Indeed, China has been severely criticized since Tiananmen, and 
this criticism has only been intensified by the Senkaku/Diaoyu island disputes and the Taiwan 
issue.44 Thus, 2001 presented a favorable time for China to regain soft power in the West by 
portraying itself as an ally of the U.S. in a fight against a common enemy: global terrorism. 
Chien-peng Chung observes that the Uyghur were chosen as China’s local terrorist threat: “The 
September 11 attacks and the subsequent crisis offered an opportunity for the government to 
reframe its battle with the Uyghur separatists as part of a larger international struggle against 
terrorism.”45 In the subsequent months and years, China supported this hypothesis by actually 
framing tightened security in Xinjiang and more limited cultural and religious freedom for the 
Uyghur as their contribution to the war on terror. At first, this designation of the Uyghur as 
China’s domestic terrorists was not accepted by the international community; when China first 
referenced the ETIM in an official state document in 2001 titled “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Kilic Bugra Kanat, “ ‘War on Terror’ as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as Terrorists in the 
People's Republic of China,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32.4 (2012): 512-518, accessed October 2, 2015, 
doi:10.1080/13602004.2012.746179. 
44 Kanat, “ ‘War on Terror’ ,” 512.  
45 Chung, “China's 'War on Terror’,” 10.  
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by ‘East Turkestan’ Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban”, the 
U.N. and U.S. both refused to accept the nexus between the ETIM and terrorism. Instead, both 
the ETIM and ETLO were considered separatist organizations, and China was accused of 
unjustifiably conflating separatism with terrorism.46 However, less than a year later in 2002, both 
the U.N. and U.S. reversed this policy view, and officially added the ETIM to a global list of 
terrorist organizations, with promises to defund this organization.47 Furthermore, in 2011, 
WikiLeaks published a file about the Guantanamo Bay prison camp that revealed twenty-two 
suspected Uyghur were held there since shortly after 9/11,48 a fact affirmed by a U.S. 
congressional record article later that year, which referred to the Uyghur detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay as “trained terrorists.”49  
 China’s increasing crackdown on Xinjiang has been exhaustively documented and 
analyzed by scholars on China. Kanat, Chung, and other China specialists like Matthew 
Teague,50 Teemu Naarajärvi51, and Sean Roberts52 all extensively analyzed trends in the CCP’s 
treatment of the Uyghur. For example, Kanat applies a qualitative analysis primarily to other 
scholarly articles and Chinese reports. Naarajärvi, likewise, focuses on Chinese studies and 
official statements. Sean Roberts, on the other hand, examines alleged Uyghur terrorists attacks 
                                                
46 Sean Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist 
Threat,” Ponars Eurasia (2012), accessed September 27, 2015, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/RobertsWP.pdf.  
47 U.S. Department of the Treasury, IIP Digital, Treasury Dept. on Addition of ETIM to Terrorist List (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002).  
48 “Prisoner List for China,” The Guantanamo Files, accessed September 29, 2015, 
https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/country/CH.html. 
49U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, Additional Concerns Regarding Matthew Olsen’s Nomination: 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2011). 
50 Matthew Teague, “The Other Tibet,” National Geographic, December, 2009, Accessed 5 November, 2015, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx direct=true&db=aph&AN=45411654&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
51Teemui Naarajärv, “War on Terror with Chinese Characteristics?” Per Urales ad Orientem : Iter polyphonicum 
multilingue 264 (2012), accessed September 27, 2015, http://www.sgr.fi/sust/sust264/sust264_naarajarvi.pdf.   
52 Sean Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism,” 2.  
18 
Jai       
in China and corresponding Chinese statements about these attacks in an effort to frame the 
designation of China’s efforts in Xinjiang as part of the war on terror.  
 These scholars exclusively focus on how China appropriated the “war on terror” to justify 
the harsh repression of the Uyghur. Though their research is important to understanding how the 
international community responded to 9/11, it is equally important to examine how the U.S., as 
the instigator of the official war on terror, in essence aided and abetted China’s policy toward the 
Uyghur. A detailed study of changes in the U.S. framing of the Uyghur pre- and post-9/11 can 
offer valuable insight into the ways that the U.S. changed it rhetoric leading up to and following 
major policy decisions that affect the Uyghur, such as its designation of the ETIM as a terrorist 
organization. In particular, the official documents provide valuable insight into the framing of 
this ethnic minority in U.S. public discourse. Indeed, this thesis argues that in addition to 
historically framing the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses, in response to China’s 
appropriation of the war on terror, the U.S. created and perpetuated three conflicting frames onto 
the Uyghur: a frame that extends this victim narrative to include the victimization on the basis of 
the war on terror; a markedly distinct frame that admits the possibility of Uyghur violence; and a 
final frame that directly acknowledges and even condemns the Uyghur as terrorists.  
 
Data and methodology 
This paper compiles and analyzes official source documents from the U.S. in order to inform the 
scholarly community about how the U.S. understanding of China’s treatment of the Uyghur 
changed and continues to change because of the war on terror, and the types of frames projected 
onto this controversial ethnic group. I examine official U.S. documents and statements about the 
Uyghur before and after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Given that the major news agencies 
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in China like Xinhua or The People’s Daily associated with statements about the “Uyghur 
terrorism problem” are state-controlled, the U.S. counterpart of these statements consist of 
documents from state-controlled sources of information. These U.S. statements, like the 
documents from state-controlled news sources in China, are produced by the government and are 
therefore accessible to the general public within and outside of the U.S. The overall category of 
U.S. statements is divided into several subcategories based primarily on their source: the Library 
of Congress, the Department of State, and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
(CECC). In addition to organizing the data into subcategories, I also lay out the following 
protocol for data recording: 1) date (pre-9/11 or post); 2) type of U.S. official document; 3) 
specific number of mentions of Xinjiang,Uyghur/Uighur, separatist, terrorist, or extremist; 4) 
outstanding quotes; 5) analysis of overall language use, broader values, norms, ideologies, and 
other contextual factors embedded in a particular (set of) document(s) as well as the intended 
audience/purpose; and 6) people to contact for follow-up interviews. 
 Examining how the Uyghur are differently framed over time due to the war on terror 
requires a methodology suited to understanding the oftentimes ambiguous and even multiple or 
changing meanings of public statements on this complex and evolving political issue. 
Consequently, this paper utilizes the strengths of qualitative discourse analysis to interpret the 
primary data and to place these interpretations into a coherent, useful analysis. Qualitative 
discourse analysis is a valuable method of analysis for two main reasons. First, qualitative 
discourse analysis seeks to “deal with the richness of complexities,” and to search for underlying 
meanings by using the context of broader values, norms, ideologies, and other contextual factors 
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in a document.53 Second, qualitative discourse analysis can be used to track shifts in state and 
party ideologies and news coverage. Indeed, this method is well-suited to track changes in 
discourse about the Uyghur in official U.S. documents because it incorporates the premise that 
the formation of a discourse is a purposeful, active process.54 I deploy qualitative discourse 
analysis to interpret data from official documents with the ultimate purpose of identifying clear 
trends in the U.S. over time with regard to how the Uyghur’s are framed in state-sanctioned 
discourse. 
 Though these two advantages make qualitative discourse analysis the most promising 
method of research for the following data sets, this method is not without its limitations. Critics 
argue that this type of analysis is overly subjective, so the interpretation of data can be skewed to 
fit the researcher’s hypothesis. Indeed, scholars sometimes reject research employing qualitative 
discourse analysis on the grounds that the scholar’s interpretation of data is incomplete and 
potentially biased. Proponents of qualitative discourse analysis acknowledge the subjectivity of 
interpretation, but argue that a principled and intellectual defensible deployment of this 
subjectivity can help to produce a more critical and accurate interpretation than one achieved 
through quantitative data. While it can be helpful to look at the lexical collates to the Uyghur, to 
understand how the Uyghur are framed over the period of many years, even decades, scholars 
need to deploy an interpretive method of analysis that allows for a deeper examination of the 
ideational collates to the Uyghur. Though “official documents are intended to be read as 
                                                
53Jared J. Wesley, “The Qualitative Analysis of Documents,” From Text to Political Positions: Text Analysis Across 
Disciplines, ed. Bertie Kaal et al. (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2014), 143. 
54 See, for example, Richardson’s use of qualitative discourse analysis to record how the “ideational framing” of 
British Muslims in journalistic texts changed over the course of three elections by taking comprehensive samples of 
newspaper reports to analyze how discourse changed in these media texts over time. 
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objective statements of fact,” they are in reality “socially produced.”55 Official U.S. statements 
always have an agenda, and sometimes those purposes may be ambiguous or not explicitly 
stated, and the meaning drawn from those statements by government actors may even change as 
U.S. interests and analyses of a situation shift. Ambiguous or concealed agenda can be 
uncovered by elucidating how state actors engage in discursive practices in an effort to 
(re)produce hegemonic understanding of the target object—in this case the Uyghur and their 
relationship to China. Since discourse and language are understood as a social practice, 
qualitative discourse analysis reinforces the idea that the formation of a discourse is itself an 
active means of political and social change, which in turn allows for the interpretation of the 
framing of the Uyghur in official, public discourse in the U.S. as an active social practice with an 
ultimate purpose that can be discovered. 
 Obviously this research does not include classified U.S. documents on the Uyghur. No 
doubt access to these materials would help scholars gain a fuller and more complete picture of 
how the Uyghur issue affects relations between the U.S. and China. Nevertheless, unclassified 
official government documents still offer valuable insight into how, and perhaps why, the U.S. 
government frames the Uyghur issue as it does through its various branches of government and 
other official political venue. This framing is in itself a decidedly worthwhile facet of 
international relations, because changes in discourse have the potential to inform us about 
changes in policies and, ultimately, political relationships. Discerning the rationale behind why 
an official document refers to the Uyghur may aid our understanding of the timing and logic 
supporting major policy changes, like the decision to designate the East Turkestan Independence 
                                                
55 Toolkit, “Document Analysis, “ n.d. http://www.drcath.net/toolkit/document.html. 
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Movement as a terrorist organization in 2002, and the choice to imprison twenty-two suspected 
Uyghur ETIM members in Guantanamo Bay.  
 Applying qualitative discourse analysis to U.S. official documents also allows one to 
critically assess the hypothesis that China not only appropriated the war on terror, it also co-
opted the U.S. in its efforts to crack down on the Uyghur. Indeed, this research challenges said  
hypothesis by demonstrating that U.S. responses to China’s use of the war on terror rhetoric 
actually fall on more of a spectrum.  
 Figure 2 portrays how the U.S. varied its responses to China’s bold claims of Uyghur 
terrorism. Some of these responses framed the Uyghur as victims of human rights abuses, while 
others did not fully discount the possibility of Uyghur terrorism, but more carefully characterized 
them as separatists.  Lastly, some official documents fell on the far right of the spectrum because 
they clearly framed the Uyghur as terrorists. In light of the enduring and pervasive impact 
throughout the world of the U.S. war on terror, but especially in Muslim populations, scholars 
must not only evaluate whether and how other countries appropriated this anti-terrorism 
campaign, but also how the U.S. responded to external appropriation of official state language on 
combating terror. The following four frames present four distinct ways the U.S. responded to 
China’s appropriation of the war on terror.  
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Uyghur as victims  
I argue that the U.S. changed its discursive practice of identifying the Uyghur as human rights 
victims and instead moved to associate the Uyghur with violent resistance and terrorism. The 
eventual political shift to the ETIM being designated as a terrorist organization was presaged by 
the discursive movements manifested in official U.S. statements in multiple public arenas.  
The first association evident throughout these official statements is made between the 
Uyghur and the harsh treatment and oppression imposed on them by China. This history of 
referring to the Uyghur as victims of a repressive regime constitutes a useful baseline for 
tracking subsequent changes in association. Prior to 9/11, the Uyghur are referred to exclusively 
as victims of rampant human rights abuses in XUAR. Many of these texts are linked in their 
condemnation of the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghur minority, and advocacy of 
more religious freedom and cultural diversification. For example, a concurrent (i.e., non-binding) 
resolution proposed in Congress in 2000 stated:  
The Chinese government has imprisoned a person from almost every Uyghur family in Ghulja City since 
1996. At present, the Chinese government is still arresting hundreds of Uyghur and mercilessly torturing 
them in the prisons. The Chinese human rights violation of the Uyghur people is nowhere to be found in the 
world.56 
 
This concurrent resolution’s purpose was to urge the Chinese government to release Rebiya 
Kadeer, the Uyghur human rights activist, so the statement that “a person from almost every 
Uyghur family in Ghulia,” a city in Northwestern Xinjiang, has been imprisoned and 
“mercilessly tortur[ed]” works to advance this cause by emphasizing the extreme extent to which 
the government’s hand reached—that is, into almost every Uyghur household. Obviously, the 
U.S. cannot impose their rule of law on China; even a joint resolution passed by Congress and 
                                                
56 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, Congressional Resolution 81, sp. Senator William V. Roth Jr., CR 
S3269-3270 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2000). 
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signed by the President would have no legal consequence. Because of this lack of enforceability, 
some may argue that concurrent resolutions are not a useful means of analyzing U.S. politics. 
Moreover, this particular concurrent resolution failed to pass, upon a Congressional vote of 170-
260.  Yet the very lack of enforceability and overwhelming defeat of this concurrent resolution 
begs us to question why members of Congress bothered to consider it at all. Sometimes joint 
resolutions are proposed to satisfy a domestic constituency, but it is, prima facie, implausible to 
suggest that a serious domestic constituency exists in the U.S. that has the political heft to 
influence U.S. support of the Uyghur population. More plausible is that Congress sought to 
engage in U.S.-China relations by discursively invoking the status and bodies of the Uyghur 
minority as victims of Chinese human rights abuses. Change in discourse can produce a change 
in politics, and even an unenforceable resolution can nonetheless impact Sino-U.S. relations. 
Therefore, although this document was never presented to the Chinese government, it still shows 
how, prior to 9/11, members of the U.S. government framed the Uyghur as human rights victims, 
with the clear intent of presenting this frame to the Chinese government in public discourse.  
 This framing of the Chinese government as abusive and intrusive was not new in 2000, 
nor strictly associated with human rights violations against the Uyghur. In May of 1999, a 
congressional resolution on the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre was 
released. This resolution holds a particularly contemptuous tone towards governmental authority 
in China:  
[P]erhaps any representative of the government could tell us that there are no persecuted Christians in 
China. Perhaps they could tell us there is no ethnic and religious persecution in Tibet or Xinjiang. Perhaps 
they could tell us there are no forced abortions or forced sterilization, no dying rooms for unwanted 
children, usually baby girls and usually handicapped children. They also perhaps could tell us there is no 
political suppression or dissent and no torture. Of course, we would know that is a lie, but it is about time 
we held them to account.57 
                                                
57 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, Concerning Tenth Anniversary of Tiananmen Square Massacre, sp. 
Rep. Nancy Pelosi, H.Res. 178 (106th): (Washington, D.C., U.S. Library of Congress, 1999).  
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Unsurprisingly, this simple resolution passed with an overwhelming majority: 418-0. After all, 
how could any member of the House vote against a bill to “express sympathy for the families of 
those killed” in the 1989 democratic protests, and condemn “egregious human rights abuses by 
the Chinese government?”58 Though the Uyghur are seldom mentioned in the news or pubic 
school curriculums, the persecution of Christians, forced sterilizations, and the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre are held up as examples of atrocities in China. Therefore, by grouping human 
rights abuses against the Uyghur in Xinjiang with these more widely known abuses, the Uyghur 
issue assumes the negativity surrounding these other controversial issues.  
 Prior to 9/11, in U.S. official documents, the Uyghur were mentioned exclusively in 
reference to human rights issues, rather than associated with terrorism, or defended as nonviolent 
activists. As a result, the U.S. did little more for the Uyghur than support Rebiya Kadeer and 
issue concurrent resolutions protesting human rights abuses. Also, neither the Uyghur nor 
Xinjiang appear anywhere on the Congressional Executive Commission on China’s website prior 
to 2002. Moreover, there is no mention of China, let alone the Uyghur, in the Department of 
State’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism Report prior to 9/11. Although, this report notes that 
“several nations in East Asia experienced violence in 2000,” China is not listed among these 
nations.59 On the other hand, the Uyghur appear in the Department of State’s International 
Religious Freedom Report and International Human Rights Report prior to 9/11:  
In China . . . particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in minority areas, especially in Tibet and 
Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental freedoms intensified. Some minority groups, 
particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing pressure as the Government 
clamped down on dissent and "separatist" activities.60 
                                                
58Ibid.  
59 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism, n.a.: (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Department of State, 2000).  
60U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, n.a.: 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State,1999).  
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At this point, Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uyghur were often referenced together as victims 
of China’s repressive, anti-religion policies. The Uyghur were not yet differentiated by either 
China or the U.S. as more closely associated with any terrorism or tension with the Middle East. 
Furthermore, “separatist” appears in quotation marks, suggesting that the State Department 
questioned this designation. Similarly, the International Religious Freedom Report  issued a few 
months before 9/11 cites police crackdowns on centers of Muslim religious activity and worship 
in Xinjiang because of accusations from the local police of Uyghur separatist activity.61 In 
addition, although several terrorist incidents are mentioned in this report, none are associated 
with the Uyghur, either directly or indirectly. Instead, these events are attributed to “unknown 
terrorists.”62 At this point, some may argue that the U.S.’s dismissal of accusations of Uyghur 
violence before 9/11 is due to the fact that the Uyghur were nonviolent before 9/11 and China’s 
subsequent crackdown. However, this argument focuses on how, despite China’s claims of 
Uyghur violence well before 9/11, the U.S. continued to classify the Uyghur as “separatists” at 
worst, and more commonly as victims of human rights abuses until after 9/11.  
 
Victims of the war on terror 
The U.S. framing of the Uyghur changed dramatically after 9/11. Indeed, following the 
September 1, 2001 attacks, this narrative of the Uyghur as victims of China’s repressive regime 
was extended to a view of the Uyghur as victims of China’s war on terror. Scholars documented 
and analyzed how the Chinese government leveraged the war on terror to deflect public attention 
away from domestic problems and create solidarity in the face of the perception of a terrorist 
                                                
61 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2001 Report on International Religious Freedom, n.a.: 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 2001).  
62 Ibid. 
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threat.63 The U.S. government, likewise, noted and criticized this ulterior motive in many of its 
public statements. For example, in a Congressional article released about a month after 9/11, a 
representative stated:  
Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Chinese officials pledged to join the global 
effort against terrorism. But comments made by Chinese officials following the attacks indicate that they 
may try to exact policy concessions from the United States in exchange for support for anti-terrorism 
efforts. For example, according to a Reuters article on September 18, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Zhu Bangzao stated, “The United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against 
terrorism. China, by the same token, has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and 
understanding in the fight against terrorism and separatists.”64 
Here, the U.S. directly questions China’s motives behind its alleged support for U.S. 
antiterrorism efforts. Although the Uyghur are not mentioned specifically, the speaker points out 
that China’s assistance comes with the caveat of policy concessions exacted from the U.S.; 
specifically, the policy concession that the U.S. allow China more freedom in its domestic fight 
against “terrorism and separatists.” Against the backdrop of frequent associations between 
Tibetans and Uyghur with terrorism and separatism, the price of China’s support for the U.S. war 
on terror was allowing China a freer hand in its treatment of groups like the Uyghur. The Uyghur 
were more directly referred to as victims of China’s war on terror in subsequent government 
documents:  
Meanwhile, in northwest China, the international war against terrorism is used to justify harsh repression in 
Xinjiang, home to China's mainly Muslim Uighur community. Several mosques have been closed, use of 
the Uighur language has been restricted and certain Uighur books and journals have been banned. The 
crackdown against suspected “separatists, terrorists and religious extremists” intensified following the start 
of a renewed security crack-down in October 2003. Arrests continue and hundreds of dissidents remain in 
prison.65 
In this quote, found in another concurrent resolution released on the anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre, it is apparent that the Uyghur issue became closely connected with 
                                                
63 See Kanat, Chung, and other China specialists like Teague, Naarajärvi, and Roberts who are cited in the literature 
review. 
64 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record 107th Congress 1st Session, n.a., CR 
S11096-S11097 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2001). 
65U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, Condemning the Crackdown on Democracy Protestors in 
Tiananmen Square, Beijing in the People’s Republic of China on the 15th Anniversary of that Tragic Massacre, sp. 
Christopher Smith of New Jersey, H3684-H3689 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2004). 
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this more well-known instance of human rights abuse in China. Even the title of the resolution 
patently denounces China:  “Condemning the Crackdown on Democracy Protestors in 
Tiananmen Square, Beijing in the People’s Republic of China on the 15th Anniversary of that 
Tragic Massacre.” However, in contrast to previous documents which clearly conflate human 
rights abuses in Xinjiang with those in Tiananmen, this particular document goes further by 
specifically identifying the war on terror as the very tool China employs to implement its 
repressive religious and ethnic policies. Indeed, after introducing the idea that the war on terror is 
used to “justify harsh repression in Xinjiang,” this statement lists specific examples of the 
application of this anti-terrorism campaign to the Uyghur, including shutting down mosques, 
banning religious books, and imprisoning dissidents. Here in the U.S., one’s religious freedom is 
considered a constitutional right, so this statement paints Xinjiang as nothing short of a dystopia 
controlled by the authoritarian regime that is the Chinese government. 
  This oppressor-oppressed narrative continues throughout this period and up to the 
present in various official documents articulating U.S. policy. For example, in its most recent 
human rights report, U.S. State Department states, “The government continued to repress 
Uyghurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders.”66  
Another Congressional concurrent resolution urging the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights to call on the PRC’s government to end human rights violations also included China’s 
leveraging of the war on terror against the Uyghur as a strong reason for U.N. action: “The 
Chinese Government has used the international war on terror as a pretext for a harsh crackdown 
on Uighurs in Xinjiang, including those expressing peaceful political dissent and independent 
                                                
66 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, n.a.: 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 2014).  
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Muslim religious leaders.”67 These documents, which clearly fall among those depicting the 
Uyghur as victims of the war on terror, also clearly discount the notion of a substantiated Uyghur 
terrorist threat in China. Indeed, in its annual report in 2006, the U.S. Congress discredited 
China’s claims of increasing terrorist activity in Xinjiang by looking at the broader context of 
China’s history of repression in the region: 
The government uses counterterrorism policies as a pretext for severely repressing religion in the XUAR. 
The government describes security conditions in the XUAR in a manner that suggests terrorist attacks 
continue in the region, even as official sources indicate that no terrorist attacks have taken place in the 
XUAR since 1999. Authorities continue to detain and arrest XUAR residents engaged in religious activities 
deemed unauthorized and have charged them with a range of offenses, including state security crimes. The 
government targets "religious extremism," splittism, and terrorism in anti-crime campaigns, calling them 
the "three evil forces." The government began tightening control over religious practice in the region in the 
early 1990s, following unrest in the region, but intensified its crackdown after September 11, 2001. Official 
sources published in 2001 recorded an increase in the number of Uighurs sent to prison or reeducation 
through labor centers since the mid-1990s because of religious activity.68 
 
 Here a U.S. state entity again projects a discursive frame that directly conflicts with the 
discursive frame put forth by the Chinese government, that is, the portrayal of the Uyghur as a 
group harboring the “three evil forces” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Instead, this 
document details the application of this anti-crime campaign with strong language and outright 
dismissal. Indeed, this document states “official sources indicate that no terrorist attacks have 
taken place in the XUAR since 1999.” Based on this last claim, it becomes apparent that there is 
a discrepancy between this denial of terrorism in Xinjiang and the U.S. decision to add the ETIM 
to its list of terrorist organizations in 2002. And indeed, the aforementioned texts all support the 
idea that the U.S. sees the Uyghur as nothing more than repressed victims of the Chinese 
government.  
 
                                                
67 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, H.Con.Res.83, sp. Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey, 
H.Con.Res.83 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2005). 
68 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, 2006 Annual Report, n.a.: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2006). 
30 
Jai       
Qualified disapproval  
 As Figure 2 shows, the United State’s framing of the Uyghur cannot be categorized as one 
which completely rejects Uyghur terrorism, nor one which blatantly describes the Uyghur as 
terrorists. Instead, this framing can be arranged into a spectrum, which ranges from discourse 
that frames the Uyghur as victims, to discourse that frames the Uyghur as terrorists. These next 
documents can be categorized as a group of texts which propagate a discourse that neither 
directly associates the Uyghur with terrorism, nor fully discounts the possibility of violent 
Uyghur resistance. Taken at face value, these texts seem to perpetuate the aforementioned victim 
narrative. However, a closer examination of the wording in these texts reveals small, but 
significant, deviation from previously discussed official documents. While the CECC blatantly 
dismisses Uyghur terrorism in a 2006 statement, other U.S. statements do not take such a clear 
stand on either side of the issue. For example, the Congressional concurrent resolution from 2005 
includes the statement that  “the Chinese Government has used the international war on terror as 
a pretext for a harsh crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang, including those expressing peaceful 
political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders.”69 Like previously analyzed 
documents, this text spots how China uses the war on terror as a “pretext” for consolidating 
power in the region. Unlike other statements, however, this document allows for the possibility 
of Uyghur violence through the word “including.” Indeed, this wording implies that among the 
Uyghur, there are those who do not express “peaceful political dissent.” After all, a Uyghur 
group that includes peaceful dissenters leaves room for the possibility of militant members—a 
possibility that was incompatible with previous victim narratives. A similar differentiation is 
made in the State Department’s “International Report on Religious Freedom” from 2004 and 
                                                
69 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record Online, H.Con.Res.83, n.a.: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 
2005). 
31 
Jai       
2014. Indeed, all these reports either repeat verbatim or paraphrase this claim: “[A]uthorities 
often failed to distinguish between peaceful religious practice and criminal or terrorist 
activities.”70 Again, the language employed in this text allows for the possibility of a range 
between the peaceful activist and the “terrorist” which could include “criminal.” 
 Even a human rights report from 2003 seems unwilling to either completely dismiss or 
call out Uyghur violence:  
Because the Government authorities in Xinjiang regularly grouped together those involved in “ethnic 
separatism, illegal religious activities, and violent terrorism,” it was often unclear whether particular raids, 
detentions, or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those engaged in 
violence. Many observers raised concerns that the Government's war on terror was a justification for 
cracking down harshly on Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim 
religious leaders. On December 15, the Government published an “East Turkestan Terrorist List,” which 
labeled organizations such as the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkestan Information Center 
as terrorist entities. These groups openly advocate for East Turkestan independence, but have not been 
publicly linked to violent activity.71 
 
Recall that U.S. official statements are socially produced rather than objective statements of 
facts, and even the slightest deviation in wording can indicate a political decision on the part of 
public officials. With this in mind, the decision to qualify a condemnation of the Chinese 
government’s crackdown with the phrase that it is “unclear whether particular raids, detentions, 
or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking their goals or those engaged in 
violence” cannot be overlooked, but must be taken as a purposeful phrasing. This statement 
exhibits a rather cautious attitude towards the Uyghur issue, and it signals the possibility of the 
Uyghur as terrorists. 
Furthermore, rather than directly denouncing China for leveraging the war on terror, this 
document attributes speculation of ulterior motives on China’s part to third party observers: 
                                                
70U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, International Religious Freedom Report, n.a.: (Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Department of State, 2004-2014).  
71 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, n.a.: 
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 2003).  
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“[M]any observers raised concerns that the Government's war on terror was a justification for 
cracking down harshly on Uighurs.” This tendency of the U.S. to pass the responsibility of 
implicating China in the exploration of the war on terror for political ends manifests in several 
other documents. Like the State Department, the CECC also attributes accusations of foul play 
on the part of China to nongovernmental actors in a commission analysis in 2005:  
In January 2004, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization opened a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in 
Tashkent to fight the "three evils of terrorism, splittism, and extremism" in Xinjiang and bordering member 
states. Amnesty International and other human rights groups accuse the Chinese government of using the 
post-September 11th global war on terrorism to repress peaceful Uighur demonstrations for autonomy. The 
US-based Center for Contemporary Conflict published a report in 2002 urging policymakers to recognize 
that Uighurs themselves are often divided over how best to promote their rights. The report concluded that 
only increased autonomy could prevent increases in violence.72 
 
Rather than directly accuse China of co-opting the war on terror, accusations are assigned to 
“Amnesty International [and] other human rights groups,” which are conveniently out of the 
control of the U.S. government. On the other hand, the proposal that the Uyghur are “divided 
over how to promote their rights” is attributed to the Center for Contemporary Conflict, a U.S.-
based research group, not the CECC. In this way, the CECC simultaneously criticizes China’s 
anti-terrorism efforts and differentiates between methods of protest among the Uyghur without 
actually laying claim to either statement. By passing this heavy burden of accusation onto the 
shoulders of non-state entities, the U.S. demonstrates an unwillingness to take a firm position on 
either side of the issue. Rather, the safest, most diplomatic choice appears to be one where 
human rights violations are reprimanded, and the issue of Uyghur terrorism is not directly 
addressed. 
 
 
                                                
72U.S. Congress, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Upgrade in Police Armament in Urumqi Signals 
Continued Tensions in Xinjiang, n.a.: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 2005). 
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Uyghur as threats 
A final trend that is identifiable throughout U.S. documents leading up to and following 9/11 is 
the formation of a discourse that frames the Uyghur as a dangerous group of extremists, and even 
as potential terrorists. Though the previous three frames seem to contradict U.S. policy decisions 
to treat Uyghur as threats to international safety, this final frame helps to explain this behavior. 
Indeed, in the following documents, the Uyghur are not described primarily as human rights 
victims, and China is not as harshly criticized for cracking down on Xinjiang. Instead, the U.S. 
and China seem to form a partnership in an effort to fight international terrorism. This discourse, 
which falls more towards the far right of the framing spectrum (see Figure 2), is quite apparent in 
the 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report.  
China, and Thailand also suffered a number of bombings throughout the year, many believed by authorities 
to be the work of Islamic extremists in those countries; few arrests have been made, however . . . Chinese 
officials strongly condemned the September 11 attacks and announced China would strengthen cooperation 
with the international community in fighting terrorism on the basis of the UN Charter and international law 
. . . China and the United States began a counterterrorism dialogue in late-September . . . [that] undertook a 
number of measures to improve China’s counterterrorism posture and domestic security. These included 
increasing its vigilance in Xinjiang, western China, where Uighur separatist groups have conducted violent 
attacks in recent years.73 
 
This report is in stark contrast to the 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, which contained 
no mention of the Uyghur, let alone Uyghur violence. In that report, China was not included 
among the "Several nations in East Asia [that] experienced terrorist violence in 2000.”74 Here 
China is directly and indisputably the victim of “bombings” that are “believed to be the work of 
Islamic extremists.” The word “suffered” emphasizes a victim narrative, previously unseen prior 
to 9/11, where the Uyghur were assigned the roles of the victims, and China, the perpetrator. 
Furthermore, the Uyghur are strongly associated with these bombings, as the end of this 
                                                
73 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, n.a.: (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Department of State, 2001).  
74 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism.  
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statement notes that anti-terrorism efforts in the region involve “increasing its vigilance in 
Xinjiang, western China, where Uighur separatist groups have conducted violent attacks in 
recent years.” Though other official documents actively dismiss China’s claims of Uyghur 
violence in the region, this State Department publication does exactly the opposite by 
recognizing Uyghur violence as an issue intimately connected with international terrorism, rather 
than a product of China’s political imagination or an excuse to crackdown on an independent-
minded ethnic minority. Moreover, this statement highlights U.S.-China cooperation in the war 
on terror. Though other statements focus mainly on the policy concessions China aims to exact 
for such cooperation, after noting China’s promise to cooperate with international antiterrorism 
efforts, this statement goes on to detail active bilateral cooperation at the end of 2001.  
 The Uyghur are further vilified in the official documents of other state entities. A 2009 
Congressional record article on the subject of the twenty-two Uyghur prisoners held in 
Guantanamo Bay includes several statements that directly frame the Uyghur people as 
dangerous. For example, Republican congressman Frank R. Wolf of Virginia states, “[Uyghur] 
detainees are trained terrorists who were caught in camps affiliated with Al Qaeda” and “There 
have been published reports that these terrorists were members of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement, ETIM, a designated terrorist organization affiliated with Al Qaeda.” Later, Wolf 
even states, “Those who would use terror are terrorists no matter their intended target.”75  By the 
end of this statement, it is clear that in moving the conversation from the concrete issue of 
Uyghur terrorism, to an amorphous, ill-defined fear of terrorism in general, the Uyghur are 
presumed to be terrorists.  
                                                
75U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Uyghur Terrorists, Frank R. Wolf of Virginia: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2009). 
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 Most references to Uyghur terrorism accompany statements about the ETIM. Indeed, this 
association between the Uyghur and ETIM works in a way similar to the association between the 
oppression of the Uyghur and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In documents that uphold the 
Uyghur victim narrative, references to Tiananmen are employed to strengthen the connection 
between well-known human rights abuses in Tiananmen, and current, lesser-known offenses in 
Xinjiang. In this new narrative that presents the Uyghur as terrorists, associations between the 
Uyghur and the ETIM work similarly by creating the perception of Uyghur militancy. This is 
best demonstrated in the 2002 CECC report:  
The Chinese government supports the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, but critics argue that Beijing is 
using terrorism as an excuse to crack down on human rights and religious freedoms of the Uighur Muslim 
population in Xinjiang.  However, while many Uighurs are unhappy with Beijing’s controls, they manifest 
their discontent through different means, from deep personal immersion into Islamic traditions to 
advocating independence through violent methods . . . Uighur separatists have committed occasional acts of 
violence in recent years, and a few have been linked to terrorist groups . . . In August 2002, the U.S. 
government designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a foreign organization that supports 
terrorism and placed this obscure Xinjiang separatist group under an executive order blocking its financial 
transactions and freezing its assets in the United States.76 
 
This report, which was issued four months after the decision to designate the ETIM as a terrorist 
organization, works to reconcile this designation with the conflicting frame of the Uyghur as 
victims of the war on terror, and not actual terrorists. Here, “critics” are assigned the 
humanitarian voice of dissent. Nevertheless, the structural indicator “however” separates the 
opinions of critics from the view of this document, which more directly advocates a viewpoint in 
which some Uyghur do “manifest their discontent through different means,” including “violent 
methods.” Furthermore, this statement directly links Uyghur separatists to terrorists groups, 
before giving a specific example of a group linked to terrorism: the ETIM. This particular 
framing of the Uyghur as an oppressed group with terrorist tendencies, as evidenced by multiple 
                                                
76 U.S. Congress, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2002 Annual Report, n.a.: (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Library of Congress, 2002). 
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references to the ETIM, can be traced throughout the period following 9/11 and up to the present. 
Unlike the previous three frames, this association between the Uyghur and terrorism accounts for 
U.S. policy decisions to designate the ETIM as a terrorist organization and imprison Uyghur in 
Guantanamo Bay. This final narrative frame also directly contradicts official U.S. statements that 
dismiss China’s accusations of Uyghur terrorism.  
 
Conclusion and future prospects 
The existence of these three competing frames is indicative of conflicting beliefs about the 
Uyghur within the U.S. government over time, and points to the critical importance of tracking 
the multiple discourses created and perpetuated after 9/11. Although many scholars, in their 
examination of the war on terror and repression of the Uyghur, either assign the U.S. the role of 
the willing partner in China’s campaign to crackdown on Xinjiang, or the voice of dissent, it is 
clear from a thorough examination of these official statements that the U.S. narrative cannot be 
reduced into either binary view. First, prior to 9/11 the U.S. projected the “Uyghur as victim” 
frame, in which China was strongly criticized for human rights violations toward the Uyghur in 
Xinjiang. In the months following 9/11, this narrative did not change much, but instead was 
extended to include U.S. official condemnation of China’s leveraging of the war on terror to 
justify the harsh repression of the Uyghur. The U.S. decision to not immediately adopt China’s 
“Uyghur as terrorist” frame can be attributed to the fact that the U.S., prior to 9/11, consistently 
interpreted the Uyghur as human rights victims. Therefore our government did not suddenly and 
wholesale adopt a new frame that directly contradicted the prior narrative. However, as time 
progressed, a third and fourth frame appeared in U.S. official documents. These frames look less 
favorably upon the Uyghur, and are more supportive of China’s actions in Xinjiang. Not only did 
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time affect the language of political discourse about the Uyghur, but the existence of multiple 
state entities also contributed to the projection of multiple frames. For example, the CECC, as a 
committee tasked with monitoring “human rights and the development of the rule of law in 
China,” tends to publish documents that call for more rights for this minority group.77  On the 
other hand, global terrorism reports published by the State Department directly refer to Uyghur 
terrorism. Therefore, though many agree that China leverages the war on terror to kill two birds 
with one stone by improving its international legitimacy and consolidating power over a 
historically problematic ethnic minority, a complete analysis of the Uyghur issue requires an 
examination of the multiple frames the U.S. projected in response to China’s own “war on 
terror.” Furthermore, an analysis of these four frames supports the idea that 9/11 changed the 
discourse around not only the Uyghur, but also other Muslim communities around the world. 
Although many criticize the harsh persecution of Muslim minorities, others frame these groups 
as terrorists. It is clear that U.S. is not immune to this international trend, as evidenced by the 
shifting discourse on the Uyghur in official statements. What is still unclear is the extent to 
which the U.S. will cooperate in China’s “war” against Uyghur terrorism, and any corresponding 
and possibly new frames which both China and the U.S. have yet to project onto the Uyghur 
issue in Xinjiang. 
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